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We investigate the importance of Veblen effects on work hours, namely the manner in
which a desire to emulate the consumption standards of the rich influences individuals’
allocation of time between labor and leisure.  Our model of the choice of work hours captures
Veblen effects by taking account of the influence of the consumption of the well-to-do on the
marginal utility of consumption by the less well-off.  The main result is that work hours are
increasing in the degree of income inequality.  We use data on work hours of manufacturing
employees in ten countries over the period 1963-1998, along with three different measures of
income inequality to explore this hypothesis.  Using both OLS and country-fixed-effects
estimates, we find that greater inequality predicts longer work hours. Its effects are large, and 
estimates are robust across a variety of specifications. Additional evidence suggests that while
greater inequality may induce longer hours for conventional incentive reasons, this mechanism
does not account for our results.   We show that in the presence of Veblen effects, a social
welfare optimum cannot be implemented by a flat tax on consumption but may be accomplished
by more complicated (progressive) consumption taxes or by subsidizing the leisure of the rich.
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1. Introduction
At the close of the 19th century, Thorsten Veblen proposed what he termed  pecuniary
emulation as the foundation of a theory of consumption: spending, he maintained, is driven
by relative status considerations, that is by the desire to be a particular type of person as much
as by the desire to enjoy the consumer goods per se. The Joneses, with whom one had to keep
up, were not the neighbors but the rich; their level of living became the never-attainable
objective in a consumption arms race among the less well-to-do.  In The theory of the leisure
class, he wrote: 
The motive is emulation–the stimulus of an invidious comparison... especially
in any community in which class distinctions are quite vague, all canons and
reputability and decency and all standards of consumption are traced back by
insensible gradations to the usages and thoughts of the highest social and
pecuniary class, the wealthy leisure class. Veblen (1899/1934):81. 
While valued by some economists as capturing common-sense aspects of consumption
as a form of status seeking, Veblen’s view of social preferences was soon eclipsed by the
simpler and more tractable neoclassical theory of the consumer. Relegated to the underworld
of economics, Veblen’s ideas have nonetheless resonated over the ensuing years in the writing
of Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950), and  Galbraith (1958) at the middle of the past
century and Schor (1998) and Frank (1997) at the century’s close.
 
We investigate the importance of Veblen effects in the determination of work hours,
namely the manner in which a desire to emulate the consumption standards of the rich may
influence an  individuals’ allocation of time between labor and leisure. Veblen effects are
derived from a class of social-comparison-based utility functions on which there is a growing
literature and some empirical evidence.
1 Clark and Oswald (1996) for example found that the
satisfaction levels reported by British workers (in the British Household Panel Survey) vary
inversely with the wage levels of peers. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), using data from
the U.S. NLSY,  studied the labor supply decisions of relatives, finding some evidence that
women whose sister’s husband had a higher income than their own husband were more likely
to be employed. 2 Corneo and Olivier (1997) analyze optimal taxation in Veblen-inspired model of an
indivisible conspicuous consumption good with both snobbish and conformist consumers. As
in the model below, the tax implications of the Veblen effects they model depend on the
number of consumers. 
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These studies provide some support for comparison based utility functions, but do not
test Veblen effects directly.  An explicitly Veblen-inspired study by Schor (1998) using a U.S.
sample asked respondents how their “financial status” compared to that of those in their
reference group (primarily co-workers and  friends).  While a majority of  her sample
responded that they personally did not feel pressure to “keep up with the Joneses,” Schor
found that, independently of the effects of annual and permanent income and other standard
regressors, those whose financial status was below their reference group saved significantly
less than those who were better off than their reference group. Interestingly, those who
watched TV more saved less, conditional on the other regressors.
Our model of the choice of work hours, presented in the next section, captures Veblen
effects by taking account of the influence of the consumption of the well-to-do on the
marginal utility of own consumption of the less-well-off. The main result is that work hours
are increasing in the degree of income inequality.  We then use data on average annual work
hours in ten countries over the period 1963-1998, along with data on inequality of income to
explore these hypotheses. Inequality is a predictor of work hours in both OLS and fixed-
effects  estimates;  its  effects  are  large,  and    estimates  are  robust  across  a  variety  of
specifications. We then address an alternative interpretation in which  a positive relationship
between work hours and inequality is due to the incentive effects of the latter  (Bell and
Freeman (2001)). In the penultimate section we consider some of the normative implications
of Veblen effects, identifying a class of policies which can implement a social welfare
optimum: included are subsidies for the leisure of the rich and a graduated consumption tax
(but not a flat consumption tax).
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2. Veblen Effects on Work Hours
Veblen held that consumption is motivated  by a desire for social standing  as well as
for  the  enjoyment  of  the  goods  and  services  per  se  (page  numbers  are  from  Veblen
(1899/1934):
the proximate ground for expenditure  in  excess of what is required for
physical comfort is ...a desire to live up to the conventional standard of
decency...(81) 
His  key idea was that the best-off members of a community -- “the leisure class” -- establish
the standards for the rest.3 See the works cited in Gintis, Smith, and Bowles (2002).
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The  leisure  class  stands  at  the  head  of  the  social  structure  in  point  of
reputability; and its manner of life and its standards of worth therefore afford
the norm of reputability for the community. (70)
But why is it the consumption of the leisure class that is emulated rather than their leisure?
Veblen’s response was that under modern conditions consumption is a more visible form of
display.
The exigencies of the modern industrial system frequently place individuals
and households in juxtaposition between whom there is little contact in any
other sense than juxtaposition. One's neighbors, mechanically speaking, often
are socially not one’s neighbors, or  even  acquaintances; and still their
transient good opinion has a high degree of utility. The only practicable
means of impressing one’s pecuniary ability on these unsympathetic observers
of one’s everyday life is an unremitting demonstration of the ability to pay.
..The means of communication and the mobility of the population now expose
the individual to the observation of many persons who have no other means
of judging his reputability than the display of goods...71 
As a result:
.... the present trend of the development is in the direction of heightening the
utility of conspicuous consumption as compared with leisure. (72)
Veblen’s  ideas  are  thus  a  precursor  to  the  contemporary theory  of  costly  signaling  of
otherwise unobservable qualities initiated in economics by Spence (1973) and in biology by
Zahavi (1975).
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The following model embodies the two propositions underlying Veblen’s account,
namely that people compare consumption (or wealth) but not leisure, and that they refer
upwards, choosing their work and spending activities in order  to be more like a higher
income group, rather than seeking social distance from lower income groups.  Suppose
individuals differ in some trait that influences  hourly wages and that they  choose their hours
of work (h)  to maximize a utility function,  the arguments of which are leisure (which we
normalize  as  1-h)  and  what  we  term  effective  consumption,  c*  defined  as  their  own
consumption level (c) minus a constant v (for Veblen) times the consumption level of some
higher income reference group (c
 ~). The individual’s reference group might be the very rich,
or it might be an intermediate group. The reference group’s rank  in the income distribution
is taken as exogenous, as is the Veblen constant v.  It may be convenient to think of each4 If the utility function is Cobb-Douglas in leisure and effective consumption (with a
the coefficient of c*) then the choice of hours is such that
h*/(1-h*) = a/(1-a) + vc
 ~/w(1-h)
with the increased hours indicated by the second term on the right hand side representing the
Veblen effect (if v = 0,  h = a). 
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individual as belonging to a homogeneous income class, each member of which takes the next
highest income class as its reference group (the richest class have no reference group).
Together, the reference group and v measure the nature and intensity of the relevant social
comparisons. Individuals do not save, so c = wh, where w is the wage rate.  Thus for some
individual not in the richest group we have
(1)  u = u(c*, h)
u = u((wh-vc
 ~), h)
where u  is increasing and concave in its first argument and decreasing and convex in the
second. Leisure and consumption are complements so uc*h < 0.  The effect of increased
consumption by members of the reference group thus is both to lower the utility of the
individual and to raise the marginal utility of effective consumption. The individual will
choose hours to be h*, namely that which equates the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and effective consumption to the wage rate.
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We can now consider the effects of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of
income (raising c
 ~ relative to wh for every income class except the richest). Differentiating
the individual's  first order condition for the choice of work hours  (and using the second order
condition) we find that dh*/dc
 ~ has the sign of -(uc*c* +uc*h), which is positive. The effect of
the larger gap between the consumption levels of the individual and the reference group is to
raise the marginal utility of consumption relative to the marginal utility of leisure, inducing
an increase in the hours of work. Variations in the  Veblen constant have the same sign:
dh*/dv >0 reflecting an  increase in the intensity of social comparison and perhaps capturing
the negative effect of TV watching on saving  in Schor’s study.   It is readily shown that if in
contrast to this Veblen model,  the reference group were the poor (others seeking to distance
themselves from the reference group) then an increase in inequality would induce a reduction
in work hours, giving us an unambiguous and empirically testable Veblen hypothesis distinct
from seeking distance from the poor, or social comparisons generally.
As the purpose of the model is simply to motivate an empirical investigation, it would
be unilluminating to  take account of many income groups and reference groups and to study5 Bowles (2004) presents models of this type.  
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the way that an income increase among the well-to-do may affect a sequence of groups lower
in the income distribution. One aspect of the model, however,  does deserve comment, namely
the assumption that individuals choose their hours of work. In a collective bargaining
framework or an efficiency wage model, employers play a major role in setting work hours,
and the relationship between individual preferences and observed hours may be considerably
attenuated. Not surprisingly, a significant fraction of employees in the advanced economies
would prefer hours different from what they have (Bell and Freeman (2001)) However in the
studies reported, a majority preferred current pay with current hours (rather than more hours
and more pay, or less hours and less pay) and Bell and Freeman report evidence that  most
European Community workers would prefer increases in pay  (at  the current hours) to
decreases in hours (at the current total earnings) suggesting that they are close to the hours
they would have chosen, even if the institutional setting allows no direct relationship between
individual hours choices and outcomes. This may reflect the fact that employers and unions
alike have an interest in taking account of employee preferences concerning hours of work
(to maximize job rents and improve labor discipline, for example), even if this interest
competes  with  tax  and  benefits  arrangements  which  sometimes  produce  significant
differences between actual and desired hours. As a result, individual preferences will affect
observed work hours even in environments in which employees do not literally choose their
work hours.
A second comment on the model concerns its behavioral foundations. We do not
suppose that people engage in a conscious optimizing process in selecting their work hours.
A  more plausible view is that individuals have norms concerning the appropriate division of
their time between family, friends, work, and other activities, and that these norms differ from
group to group and evolve over time. Suppose this is the case, and that people simply seek
to implement their “work hour norm”, occasionally updating this norm in response to two
kinds of information: their perceptions of the subjective well-being others and the hours of
work of others.  A plausible model of this learning process would combine payoff-based
updating with conformism: that is,  individuals  adopt the norms of those in their social group
perceived to be happier, but with a conformist  bias towards adopting norms held by large
numbers of their associates, independently of the associated utility levels.
5 Then the model
just presented gives the payoff -based aspect of the updating of the work hour norm. The main
result is  that the work hour norm typical of a given group (other than the richest) is increasing
in  the  level  of  inequality  but  that  the  short  run  Veblen  effect  might  be  attenuated  by
conformist effects. 
3. Empirical Results on Work Hours and Inequality
The  importance  of  both  social  norms  and  labor  market  institutions  in  the6
determination of work hours suggests that it may be illuminating to study work hours
averaged over individuals. We use data on average annual hours of work for ten advanced
economies. The annual data for the ten countries  presented in Figure 1 indicate substantial
and growing differences between economies. The work year in Germany exceeded that in  the
U.S. by 231 hours in 1960, and had fallen to 365  hours less than the U.S. by 1998. Many
countries show a decline in hours prior to the early 1980s followed by a leveling off or
increase (in Sweden the work year fell by 388  hours  over the first two decades and then
increased by 128 hours over the next two decades)
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Because the reference group for Veblen effects are the rich, we chose a  measure
of income inequality that is sensitive to upper incomes, namely the ratio of the highest
earnings  in 90
th percentile  (that dividing the 90
th from the 91











earnings in the 50
th percentile. (We also present estimates using two alternative measures
of inequality, the Gini coefficient of after tax  incomes from the Luxemburg Income Study
and a Theil index of inter-industry wage differences.) Figure 2 presents the percentile  data
along with the annual hours, as well as the country means for these variables. The simple
correlation   ( r = 0.66) is substantial,  but as we will seee, it arises in part from covarying
influences on hours and inequality. 
            Figure 2. Earnings Inequality (percentile ratio) and Average Annual Work Hours 
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We therefore estimate a more complete model. 
(2) h
it = a + bg
it + cx
it + 
















it is the natural logarithm of hours in country i in time t, g is the measure of inequality,
x
it is a vector of other possible exogenous influences on hours (with c its vector of estimated
coefficients),  
￿ i is a country fixed effect, 
￿
t is a year fixed effect, and µ
it is an error term. The
country fixed effects will take account of cultural and institutional differences and other
country-specific unobserved influences on hours. Among the x-variables we considered union
density (to capture possible time varying institutional differences), real gross domestic
product per capita (to measure possible influences of income levels on consumption and
leisure preferences) and real  manufacturing wages (to capture possible labor supply effects).
The latter two were expressed in common units using purchasing power parity conversions.
Because hours vary cyclically in response to labor demand rather than to individual labor
supply decisions, we also include a measure of aggregate unemployment. To account for
changes in the gender composition of the workforce we include the women as a fraction of
employment. Finally we included year fixed effects to capture the possible influences of
changes in preferences (or other determinants of work hours) possibly reflecting the diffusion
of  what  Inglehart  (1977)  terms  “post  materialist  values.”  (However,  extensive
experimentation with the available  measures of “post materialist values” did not reveal any
systematic results). 
We treat g as exogenous. Changes in work hours affect total labor supply and thereby
might influence g, but this effect would operate via wage rates, and we assume that these
effects, if they exist, are captured by our wage variable. A plausible exogenous instrument for
g proved impossible to find. But a companion study (Park (2003)) addressed this problem by
exploring the effects of inequality in male earnings on wives' labor force participation in the
U.S., with results similar to those presented below. 
Our estimates appear in Table 1. Our preferred estimate (I) as well as alternative
estimates using other measures of inequality (II) and (III) indicate significant positive effects
of inequality on work hours. Moreover, these effects are large. A standard deviation change
in  90/50 percentile ratio, Gini, and Theil, is associated with a predicted increase in annual
hours of 3.4, 2.2 and 1.8 percent respectively.  Taken literally this means that the difference
in the U.S. and Swedish percentile ratio in 1992 accounts for  59 percent of the difference
between the hours of work in the two countries.
The estimates also suggest a small (and in the preferred estimate, not significant)
negative labor supply elasticity. The unemployment rate has the predicted coefficient, as does
the female proportion in employment (with the exception of (II) the results of which may be
less reliable, given the much smaller sample size).  In OLS estimates (not shown) Union
Density had a large and statistically significant negative coefficient; but in these country
fixed-effects equations its coefficient is small and positive, suggesting that our country fixed
effects may be capturing some of the institutional differences associated with the degree of
unionization.  The  specific  country  effects  across  all  of  the  equations  indicate  major9
differences among the countries due to idiosyncratic effects of time invariant cultural,
institutional and other country differences  uncorrelated with the regressors.  Sweden and
Norway are similar in their short work year while the english-speaking countries are distinct
and not significantly different from one another in  their long work hours;  the remainder of
the continental countries occupy a middle ground with Belgium closest to the Nordic pattern.
The country-effect difference between the English speaking and the Nordic group is about 295
hours per year, indicating large idiosyncratic effects presumably due to cultural, political, and
other differences. 
We estimated the same fixed-effects equations as in Table 1, but using as our
dependent variable the natural logarithm of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics series  on
average annual  hours of manufacturing workers. This series may provide a more accurate
measure of hours (but for a more limited portion of the population.) The results in Table 2,
which cover the same countries and time period,  show that the coefficients of our three
inequality measures are highly significant, and of approximately the same magnitudes as those
using the OECD labor hours series. Table 2 also presents the estimated coefficients of our
inequality measures for a specification without the country fixed effects (but with the year
fixed effects.)  As expected, the estimates of the Veblen effect are considerably larger, but
these are likely to be upward biased because of the co-variation of both hours and inequality
with time-invariant country-specific differences, the effects of which are captured in our
fixed-effects estimates. 
The fact that inequality predicts work hours is consistent with the Veblen effects
proposed at the outset, but there are other consistent explanations. Bell and Freeman (2001))
have suggested that inequality induces longer work hours because those who work longer
hours attain a higher percentile rank in the wage distribution at the workplace and an increase
in rank implies greater wage gains the more unequal is the wage distribution.  They provide
convincing evidence for this effect: In the U.S. and Germany wage inequality within detailed
occupation/industry cells is positively correlated with work hours for those working more
thirty-five hours per week and longer. 
Discriminating empirically between this incentive-based account and the Veblen
effects interpretation offered here may be impossible, and it is very likely  that both incentive
and Veblen effects are at work. However, we are not persuaded that the Bell and Freeman
model accounts for the relationship apparent  in  Figure 2 and Table 1. First, Bell and
Freeman treat long hours as an effective signal of a difficult to observe quality likely to result
in promotion. While this is true for young lawyers as in the account by  Landers, Rebitzer, and
Taylor (1996), we think it more likely that hard work when on the job (that is, effort, not
hours) is a more common way to move up. Second, the fact that their inequality hours
relationship is much weaker (in both the U.S. and Germany) for all workers (rather than just
those working full time or more) is not easy to reconcile with their model. Finally  Bell (1998)6 Both estimates are smaller than the estimate in Table 1 and are only marginally
significant, suggesting that inequality may explain much of the distinct nature of the two
periods evident in figure 1, while providing a weaker account of the within-period movements.
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found that black workers in the U.S. in 1990 are more responsive to measures of earnings
inequality  among  blacks  only.  Bell  suggests  that  this  may  be  because  the  black-only
distribution is a better indicator of the gains to working longer hours (but points out that it is
not easy to explain why this would be so). A more parsimonious explanation might be  that
the relevant reference group for black workers is other black workers, and their response to
measures of black-only inequality is picking up a Veblen effect. 
These caveats about the Bell-Freeman interpretation are far from decisive, however.
It would be valuable to see if the evidence for Veblen effects is robust when using a measure
of inequality that could not plausibly be related to the incentive effects they stress. The most
plausible measure of inequality for the incentive effects view would be within firm or within
industry inequality, of the type Bell and Freeman used. The reason is that if workers are
putting in extra hours to impress their employer, it is the firm's wage structure that is
providing the incentive, not the level of inequality within other firms, and less still, the
difference in average wages between firms. (Employers in other firms have no way of
knowing how many hours a worker puts in.)  Thus the Theil index of  inter-industry average
wage inequality provides such a test.  The fact that this measure of inequality is a significant
predictor of work hours (equation II in Table 1) suggests that the Veblen effects model
captures some of the causal mechanisms at work, for this measure could not possibly be
capturing the Bell-Freeman incentive effects.  Notice (equation IV) that the estimate of its
coefficient is reduced only marginally by the addition of the percentile ratio to the equation,
suggesting that the estimated effect on work hours in equation III is not primarily due to the
correlation of the Theil index with other measures of inequality that may be picking up
incentive effects modeled by Bell and Freeman. 
A second alternative interpretation of the inequality-hours relationship is that the
acceleration of skill-intensive technical change over the last two decades may have increased
inequality and at the same time increased hours of work. Freeman (2002) for example, found
that in the U.S. those using computers or the Internet at work put in longer hours, and we
know from Krueger (1993) that computer use has raised the economic returns to schooling.
Taken together, these two facts suggest that an exogenous increase in computer use may
account for a positive correlation between hours and earnings inequality.   We do not think
this accounts for our results, however, because when we split our time period (at 1983) using
the Theil index (the only measure on which we have sufficiently long time series to do this)
we find that its estimated coefficient in the early period is almost twice that in the later
period.




If Veblen effects of the type modeled here are important, there may be a case for
public policies to limit consumption on the conventional grounds that it generates social costs
not accounted in the private calculations of the consumer.  Frank (1997) and others have
recently proposed a tax exemption for savings on just this grounds.
7 Veblen effects are an
example of this class of consumption externalities, but with the two following special
characteristics. 
First,  note  that    the  usual  consumption  externalities  are  symmetrical  (my
consumption reduces the well being of the Jones’ I am trying to keep up with, just as theirs
reduces mine). But Veblen effects are asymmetrical: if the Jones’ are richer than me, they do
not care about my consumption but instead are trying to keep up with some even richer
reference group. Thus Veblen effects cascade downward through the income distribution with
the richest group inflicting subjective costs on the next group, whose emulation of  the
consumption of the rich then augments its own consumption level thus passing additional
subjective costs to the groups further down. 
A second difference is that the influence of a reference group may be substantially
independent of its size, so a relatively small number of well-off but visible consumers may
constitute the reference consumption standard for a much larger number of less well-off
individuals. In this case their consumption decisions may inflict subjective costs on large
numbers of less well-off individuals. For both reasons -- the asymmetry of the effects and the
differing sizes of various ranks in the income distribution -- an appropriate policy response
to Veblen effects may be a progressive consumption tax rather than the flat consumption tax
implied by symmetrical consumption externalities. 
To see why this is true take a simple two-class society in which there are a number
(normalized to unity) of well-off individuals indicated by the superscript r,  and a larger
number, n, of less  well-off people. As our point is to clarify the logic of policies to correct
Veblen-effects rather than to advocate particular policies, we will retain our simplifying
assumptions (including that there is no saving). We also set the wage of the less  well-off at
unity. Suppose that all (the rich and the not-so- rich)  share the following utility function (a
variant of (1) used above). 
(3) u = lnc* - 
￿ h8  Were there m members of a third (poorer) class with a wage rate w
o and hours of
work h
o, a tedious calculation shows that
h
r*(1 + vw




which in the absence of Veblen effects (v = o, so c*=wh) would lead each utility maximizing
individual to set h=1/
￿ .  However, with v > 0 the work hours of the rich are unaffected, but




￿  + vw
rh
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that is, they work more hours, as we would expect, the second term representing the Veblen
effect.  
Suppose a social planner wished  to know what level of work hours of both groups
would maximize the sum of utilities in this society or 
(5)










The planner would know that in the social optimum the consumption of the well-off
will be less than under private optimization, and because there are no savings, the only way
to accomplish this is to reduce the work hours of the well-off. As the work hours of the lower
group generate no externalities (they are the reference group for no one) the planner would
simply vary h
r to maximize 
￿ , using (4) to take account of the endogenous response of  h
n to
the planner’s chosen level of  h
r.  While private optimization induces the rich to equate the
marginal contribution of work to (private) consumption utility  (1￿h
r ) to the (private)
disutility of labor (




￿  +  
￿ nvw
r
where the first term on the right is the private cost (disutility of labor) experienced by the rich
and the second is  the sum of the marginal social cost imposed on those attempting to emulate






which  shows  that  the  welfare optimum  requires  the  rich  to  work  less  than  1/
￿   by    a
proportional amount nvw
r which  is equal to the sum of the loss in effective consumption
imposed on the lower income group. The required change in the work hours of the rich is
proportional to both the relative size of the two income groups and to their wage rates.
8   As9 If there exists a third, poorer class,  as defined in the previous footnote, and the
intermediate class is taxed at the rate 
￿
m < 1, the optimal tax on the consumption of the rich
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the social optimum requires a change in the labor-leisure allocations of the higher-income
reference group but not of the lower income group,  the social planner will not introduce an
across the board consumption tax (applying to both groups). A well designed policy will
target the consumption of the rich specifically, as it is this which generates the negative
externalities.
It is obvious from (6) that the implied reduction in the work hours of the rich could
be implemented by policies  which enhance their marginal utility of leisure (or what is
equivalent, increasing their marginal disutility of labor) by a proportional amount 
￿ nvw
r.  This
could be accomplished, for example by subsidizing the leisure activities of the rich. Under
these conditions the rich would maximize
(8) u





and their private optimization would give the first order condition (6) thus  implementing (7).
Suppose the social planner’s only instrument is a linear tax on the consumption of
the well-off. The particular utility function used in this model implies that the tax will not
affect the labor hours they perform, so a tax at rate 
￿  will reduce the consumption of the
reference group by the same rate.  Assuming that the tax revenues, when spent,  yield a per
dollar contribution to aggregate welfare of 
￿
, the planner will vary 
￿  to maximize (9) 
(9) 
















The optimal tax rate 
￿ * will equate the marginal benefits (reduced Veblen effects for
the less well-off,  as well as 
￿
) to the marginal costs (in reduced consumption) to the well-off.
This can be seen (using (4) and h
r = 1/
￿ ) to require that 







so,  assuming 
￿
=0 (as we are not concerned with unrelated benefits of the tax policy), and
nvw
r   < 1,
 
(11)
￿ * = 1- 1/nvw
r
 
As expected the optimal tax is increasing in the relative size of the less well-off
group, the size of the Veblen effect, and the relative wages of the better-off group.
9 increases  to
(11')






to take account of the indirect Veblen effects (via increased work and consumption by the
middle group) on the well-being of the poorest group (the increase in 
￿ * varying positively
with the relative size of the poorer class and inversely with its wage.) 
10 A government that sought to increase output (rather than maximizing the sum of
utilities) could mobilize Veblen effects by shifting the tax burden from the rich to the less
well-off, thereby inducing higher levels of work hours among the latter. 
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5. Conclusion
The design of policies to attenuate possible market failures arising from Veblen
effects requires attention to considerations wholly absent above, including their effects on
savings, distributional impacts and political viability  (the public might not favor subsidizing
wilderness retreats for the well-off, even if, as the leisure subsidy example requires, they were
inconspicuous!) We will not address these issues here.  It is clear, however, that policies
designed to discourage consumption per se (such as the flat consumption tax discussed by
many authors) are not optimally designed to address Veblen effects. The reason is that where
Veblen effects are important, the social cost imposed by consumption depends on who is
doing it, on the structure of reference groups (who cares about whom) and the size of the
hierarchically ordered reference groups. The consumption of those who, like the well-to-do,
are directly or indirectly reference models for many would ideally be treated differently from
the consumption of those who are models to none or to few.
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Table 1. Estimates of the relationship between work hours and inequality
I II III IV
Constant 9.635 7.833 10.279 9.878
(16.95) (12.16) (30.18) (16.27)
PERCENTILE EARNINGS  RATIO 0.177
    
0.126 
(4.81) (2.95)
GINI COEFFICIENT (After-tax Income) 0.030
(2.22)
INTER-INDUSTRY EARNINGS
INEQUALITY 0.023   0.020
(5.74) (2.81)
Ln(Real Wage) -0.021 -0.041 -0.055 -0.017
  (-0.69) (-2.56) (-7.47) (-0.51)
Ln(Real GDP per capita) -0.234 -0.065 -0.256 -0.243
  (-3.70) (-0.98) (-7.30) (-3.57)
Union Density 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.018
  (3.60) (0.30) (0.64) (2.65)
Unemployment Rate -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
  (-5.17) (-5.67) (-6.25) (-4.34)
Female Proportion in Employment  -0.094 0.038 -0.070 -0.106
(-3.82) (1.17) (-4.35) (-4.18)
Country and Year Fixed Effects
    
YES     YES
    
YES
    
YES
Observations 155 89 240 143
Adjusted R-squared 0.958 0.979 0.967 0.961
 Note: The dependent variable is Ln(Average annual work hours). 
Table 2. Alternative Measures
P90/50 GINI THEIL2
Using BLS Hours
(Manufacturing)  0.090 0.042 0.033
(2.47) (2.66) (7.60)
Without Country Fixed Effect  0.528 1.015 0.066
(9.30) (7.20) (11.36)
 Note: The dependent variable is Ln(Average annual work hours). 16
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